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Plato’s Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals; 
Paul M. Churchland, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012; 299 pages (inclusive of a 




For decades now, Paul Churchland has been developing a neurophilosophical research 
program capable of bringing the findings of neuroscience, and more specifically of 
cognitive neurobiology, to bear fruitfully on some longstanding problems in philosophy of 
mind, epistemology, and metaphysics—problems whose roots stretch all the way back to 
Plato. His most recent volume, Plato’s Camera, carries on this pursuit with an explicit focus 
on the neurocognitive operations behind perception, the rise of background conceptual 
frameworks, the redeployment of conceptual frameworks to ever-expanding domains of 
phenomena, and our language dependent institutions that drive cultural changes and 
collective cognitive adventures. His ultimate goal is to delineate the explanatory advances in 
the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of science that are there for the 
taking once the brain’s sub-symbolic kinematical and dynamical resources are fully 
appreciated and recent insights from connectionist-network theory are fully utilized.  
 
Plato’s Camera begins with a short introductory chapter that offers a very condensed but 
helpful overview of the coming chapters’ contents. Chapters Two and Three deal with the 
structural changes in the brain that give rise both to an enduring conceptual framework and 
the capacity to evaluate this framework—what Churchland calls First-Level Learning. 
Chapter Four looks at how the brain redeploys the enduring concepts acquired by First-
Level Learning—what he calls Second-Level Learning. Chapter Five, Churchland’s final 
chapter, explores the role of language and of the cultural institutions arising from the use of 
language in the regulation and amplification of First- and Second-Level Learning—




predictably, this is what Churchland dubs Third-Level Learning. The book concludes with a 
brief one-page appendix that deduces Kepler’s Third Law from Newtonian mechanics. 
 
As Churchland’s title suggests, he believes the biological brain is an organic camera that 
“takes pictures” of reality’s most fundamental timeless and changeless dimensions, viz., 
abstract universals, temporal invariants, and enduring symmetries (vii). What Churchland 
really means is that the brain makes maps, millions of high dimensional maps with 
extraordinary resolution and detail that constitute our background conceptual frameworks. 
These maps packed into our brain are not linguaformal, or families of predicate-like 
elements, but rather large populations of high-dimensional prototype points and trajectories 
configured by relations of proximity and distality that mirror, to varying degrees, certain of 
the abstract invariants of the external world. These maps are Churchland’s biologically 
realistic versions of Plato’s Ideal Forms: high-dimensional structural homomorphs of the 
objective and abstract feature-domains of external realities (123). Our brains, which 
generate, operate, and deploy these maps, are profoundly representational entities, but not in 
the way that past logocentric philosophers have thought. The brain’s representational and 
cognitive capacities do not arise from manipulating propositional structures, or from any 
innate language-like primitives, but from the sub-symbolic vector coding, matrix 
processing, and map-constructing performed by cadres of synaptic connections within the 
brain. The task of Plato’s Camera is to convince us of this theory and to demonstrate how 
this neurocomputational framework helps us find our way out of a number of perennial 
philosophical dead-ends in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. 
 
In the early chapters of the book, Churchland illuminatingly compares and contrasts his 
scientific and empirically grounded account of the internal machinery of cognition to that of 
Kant’s transcendental and speculative account. Space and time were, on Kant’s account, 
pure forms of sensory intuition, while the pure concepts of understanding constituted the 
universal and unchanging framework of human judgments. These two manifolds (abstract 
structured spaces—what Churchland calls “maps”) of human experience and judgment were 
for Kant the a priori means through which human cognition arose and came to expression. 
Churchland, however, wants to make some rather dramatic changes to Kant’s account: 
specifically, he wants to replace Kant’s innate universal and unchanging maps with acquired 
changeable and local maps, maps built up by and shaped through the ongoing experience of 
the developing animal such that the animal’s brain’s synaptic modifications bear the 
structural impress of the environment and of the practical demands the environment places 
on the animal. Moreover, he wants to expand the number of maps beyond Kant’s miserly 
pair into the thousands so they include not just perceptual and conceptual representational 
spaces, but also maps for the motor behavior and skills of the organism. Clearly, for 




Churchland, these representational spaces are not proprietary to humans, but are physically 
realized in discrete anatomical locales of all animal brains (4). 
 
Furthermore, contrary to Kant’s account, judgment is not the fundamental unit of cognition. 
According to Churchland, judgment and all the logical relations it depends upon arrive 
much later (phylogenetically and ontogenetically) when language finally comes into the 
picture (a function of Third-Level Learning). Kant, having language as his only example of 
a systematic mapping/representational framework, reasonably enough thought that 
language-like structures were essential to the basic machinery of cognition. In Churchland’s 
account of the primitive units of representation and thus of cognition, Kant’s linguaformal 
primitives are replaced by activation patterns across proprietary populations of neurons—
something all organisms with nervous systems possess. The avoidance of species 
chauvinism and its concomitant logocentrism, a fault common to Kant and his later nativist 
descendants like Chomsky and Fodor, is a feature of Churchland’s account that he tirelessly 
advertises (4, 5, 33, 67). A long overdue alternative to the sentential/propositional-attitude 
model of cognitive activity—a model that has dominated philosophy for over two 
millennia—has finally arrived in the convergence of neurobiology and artificial neural 
network theory, enabling researchers to make some explanatory contact with neurostructural 
and neurofunctional details of the brain that sustain cognitive activity throughout the whole 
animal kingdom (14).  
 
According to Churchland’s thoroughly cognitive neuroscientific outlook, there are three 
fundamental types of learning constitutive of normal human intelligence. First, there is the 
slow and structural learning that every cognitively apt brain has undergone; next there is the 
volatile and dynamic learning that every cognitively apt brain constantly undergoes, and 
finally there is the learning that only cognitively apt humans possess which regulates and 
amplifies the accomplishments of the first two kinds of learning (a kind of learning that is 
unique to language users). First-Level Learning is where sensory and motor experience 
sculpt (via metrical deformation and reformation) the space of possible activation patterns 
across the brain’s 1014 synaptic connections to produce a coherent and hierarchical family of 
prototype representations/maps to function as a background conceptual framework of 
cognition. Such synaptic sculpting is a slow unconscious process, taking days, weeks, and 
even years to produce high-dimensional maps of the external structural, temporal, and 
causal invariances of the objective world. These background high-dimensional maps are 
constantly updated by virtue of reliable perceptual-indices that track the organism’s current 
placement in the maps’ feature-spaces. First-Level Learning operates prior to and 
independent of the more familiar category- and language-dependent processes of induction, 
hypothetico-deduction, and even Bayesian learning. The real mechanism of this 
fundamental form of experience-dependent, tacit learning is Hebbian learning, a purely 




structural type of synaptic adjustment and entrenchment common to all terrestrial nervous 
systems, whose fundamental operations are summed up in the aphorism “neurons-that-fire-
together-wire-together” (158).  At this pre-categorical level, we have “learning that needs 
no antecedent conceptual framework in order to get an opening grip on the world”; nor does 
it depend on supervision by a prescient agent to accomplish this task (164). It is a learning 
whereby uninterpreted spatial and temporal patterns of input energy from a creature’s 
sensory experience gradually craft differential sensitivity to axonal activations, forming “the 
background conceptual framework in which subsequent sensory inputs are preferentially 
interpreted” (165). 
 
Second-Level Learning is quite simply “the redeployment of some background conceptual 
map, already at work in some domain or other, into a new and unexpected domain of 
phenomena” (231), and as such, we might understand Churchland’s book as a grand object 
lesson in what Second-Level Learning can produce. Fundamentally, Second-Level Learning 
refers to the brain’s self-modulating and all-up neuronal activation vectors and trajectories 
that subserve perceptual and cognitive expansion. According to Churchland, the dynamical 
changes of this second level of learning take place on a much shorter timescale than the 
structural changes gradually effected by First-Level Learning (16). Second-Level Learning 
is all about conceptual changes that just are, in Churchland’s view, changes taking place in 
an animal’s neuronal activation spaces already sculpted by First-Level Learning—changes 
driven by proximal stimuli that occur within the organism millisecond-by-millisecond, but 
which effect no immediate structural changes. He depicts the brain’s dynamical activity in 
this kind of learning as a single moving point in the brain’s entire neuronal activation space, 
“a point in ceaseless motion, a point that spends its time, marble-like, rolling merrily around 
the almost endless hills and valleys of the conceptual landscape that the basic or structural 
learning process has taken so long to sculpt” (17). Second-Level Learning is therefore a 
cognitivist analogue of what evolutionary psychologists call evolutionary “exaptation”: 
devices originally developed within one environment turning out to serve differently but 
unexpectedly well in a new environment. Churchland’s favorite example of this is Newton’s 
paradigm-changing insight that the Moon is a projectile: “Newton’s sudden 
reperception/reconception of the Moon’s familiar but highly puzzling elliptical trajectory … 
as being just a large-scale instance of a flung stone’s trajectory here on Earth” (192). 
Second-Level Learning described in terms of high-dimensional neuronal kinematics for 
cognitive activity in general and vector-processing dynamics for perceptual activity in 
particular, yields, in a non-linguaformal and naturalistic format of overlapping conceptual 
maps, an epistemological framework for cognitive activity “that sustains a correspondence 
theory of our actual representational success” and “a coherence theory of how our 
representations are evaluated, by us, for their representational success or failure” (202). 
Because this kinematical and dynamical framework reveals “the brain’s capacity to get an 




increasingly broad and penetrating grip on the structure of the larger reality of which it is a 
part” (247-8), Churchland argues that it provides sufficient epistemological basis for an 
optimistic meta-induction capable of vindicating his long held but somewhat eccentric 
(given his recognition that even perception is theory-laden!) scientific realism.  
 
Turning now to what Churchland calls “Third-Level Learning,” we move from his 
delineation of both the slow and fundamental structural level of learning of individuals as 
well as their swift meta-operations of dynamical level learning to what “may be the single 
most important development in the evolutionary history of the entire hominid line” (252). 
Third-Level Learning is a language-dependent learning that enables a mutual steering and 
modulation of the cognitive activities of one’s fellow speakers, such that collective, 
cooperative, and common cognitive endeavors that exploit and regulate the first two levels 
of learning become possible for the first time. At this level of learning, brains can interact in 
radically new ways that were impossible prior to a shared language. Of Churchland’s three 
levels of learning, the third level of learning is, so far as we know, unique to humans: he 
doesn’t think it is a coincidence that no other terrestrial creature “comes within light-years 
of our own epistemic achievements, and no other terrestrial creature commands language” 
(253). 
 
Churchland notes that although no epistemology or philosophy of science prior to the 
present has had any clear conception of the first two levels of learning he details in this 
book, there has been no shortage of theories about the workings of this third level of 
learning. In his view, the sorry situation of philosophy and science up to the present has 
been one of chronically mischaracterizing the operations of the first two levels in terms of 
the logocentrism of this third level—i.e., as merely hidden, internal versions of the linguistic 
representations and operations of third level cognitive activity. Thanks to a number of 
discoveries and theoretical advances in recent neuroscience and artificial neuro-modeling, 
we now are capable of recognizing the sublinguistic, high dimensional cartographical styles 
of representation and computation that underpin this public and supra-individual level of 
learning. The domain of Third-Level Learning is where the semantic content of public 
language and of individual conceptual frameworks decouples from our human genome and 
opens to cultural suasions, and where each individual’s advancements on his or her First-
Level and Second-Level Learning is no longer limited to his or her lifespan, but gains a 
potential immorality in being off-loadable to language-dependent public structures of inter-
generational transmission and preservation (253). 
 
Due to the technicality of many of the topics covered in this book, it would not be a good 
place to start for someone interested in but largely unacquainted with Churchland’s 
neurocomputational philosophy. However, readers already somewhat familiar with his 




revisionist research trajectories in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of 
science and intrigued by his quest to constrain computational modeling of the brain based 
on knowledge of its structural, kinematical, and dynamical properties will find much to 
relish in this rigorous work. Such a reader will find that although Churchland does not really 
break any new ground in this work (except perhaps near the end of the book where he 
develops the inter-generational social and cultural impact of the linguistic constructivism of 
Third-Level Learning), he does extend and helpfully clarify a number of his longstanding 
views. To be sure, in this book, he consolidates his quest to eliminate propositional-attitude 
psychology so that the co-evolution of connectionist psychological modeling and 
neuroscience can flourish and eventually move toward unification through a series of inter-
theoretic reductions.  
 
Churchland’s prose is direct, concise, and clear. If he isn’t always exactly fair in his 
representations of opposing positions (e.g., he hardly does justice to nativism in its more 
recent nuanced and sophisticated refinements), or if he doesn’t always engage the full array 
of alternative accounts bearing on some of the issues he addresses (e.g., he fails to address 
any of the alternative computational-representational frameworks formulated recently by 
advocates of explanatory pluralism, proposals that also encourage co-evolution of theories 
pitched at different levels of description, but which refuse to give priority to lower-level 
descriptions), he can be forgiven for these because his captivating forays into a vast array of 
bordering topics, and the variety of interesting examples and illuminating illustrations 
through which he zestfully conveys  his own positions are, at least to this reader, reward 
enough.  
 
However, the one flaw in this book that I cannot find it within myself to pardon is 
Churchland’s failure to even comment on, let alone carefully to address, the basis on which 
he so easily slides up from micro-descriptions of neuronal activation vector matrixes and 
trajectories in the brain to macro-changes in a psychological agent’s concepts and cognitive 
activities. I suspect, the reason Churchland feels entitled to such easy description-level 
upgrades is that he believes ultimately, once the logocentric dynamics and kinematics of the 
“High Church Computationalism” that purportedly underwrites propositional-attitude 
psychology are repudiated and replaced by his ocularcentric connectionist maps and their 
high-dimensional vector-to-vector transformations, a smooth inter-theoretic reduction of 
these levels of description will be forthcoming, vindicating his hunch that cognition is really 
nothing but these connectionist maps and their high-dimensional vector-to-vector 
transformations, that his ocularcentric metaphorics, once embraced, will become literally 
true. 
 




In concluding this rather selective review of Plato’s Camera, I’d like to raise an issue that 
goes to the heart of Churchland’s project. It can be summed up in a question: Does the 
plausibility of his admittedly impressive and provocative account of the neuro-
computational underpinnings of human cognition arise merely from the bewitching ease 
with which he describes different energy transformations as different cognitive 
transformations? By describing certain transductions of energy from the environment to the 
central nervous system as the brain’s taking of pictures and making of maps, Churchland 
gives the impression that he is making progress in naturalizing conceptual origination and 
cognitive function, when in reality all that is objectively taking place is energy of one sort is 
being transduced into energy of another sort, e.g., electromagnetic to electro-chemical. 
After all, once certain physical processes in the brain are accepted as pictures or maps, all 
the really hard and controversial work is already done, at least when it comes to explaining 
how the brain’s activities can be about or represent anything, including itself. In the final 
analysis, I must confess that my reading of Plato’s Camera was haunted by the niggling 
suspicion that Churchland, by mere fiat, front loaded his descriptions of the sub-symbolic 
and sub-personal vagaries of energy transductions and transmissions with enough 
intentionality to make the traversing of the explanatory gap separating neuronal and 
psychological descriptions seem like a mere walk in the park. If my suspicion is correct, 
then perhaps Churchland has inadvertently provided a good case not for eliminativism, but 
for explanatory pluralism—an opposing outlook to his own that Is not even mentioned in 
his book. 
 
 
